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Many complex systems maintain a self-referential check and balance. In animals, such reﬂective
monitoring and control processes have been grouped under the rubric of metacognition. In this
introductory article to a Theme Issue on metacognition, we review recent and rapidly progressing
developments from neuroscience, cognitive psychology, computer science and philosophy of mind.
While each of these areas is represented in detail by individual contributions to the volume, we take
this opportunity to draw links between disciplines, and highlight areas where further integration is
needed. Speciﬁcally, we cover the deﬁnition, measurement, neurobiology and possible functions of
metacognition, and assess the relationship between metacognition and consciousness. We propose
a framework in which level of representation, order of behaviour and access consciousness are
orthogonal dimensions of the conceptual landscape.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Many complex systems maintain a self-referential
check and balance. In a democracy, voters may be con-
sulted not only on which politician should hold ofﬁce,
but also about the political structure itself, as when a
referendum is held on the voting system. This consul-
tation may lead, in effect, to the political structure
changing itself—an example of ‘metapolitics’. The
preﬁx ‘meta’ derives from the Greek for ‘beyond’ or
‘with’ to indicate a concept that abstracts from another
concept, often (but not always) with a self-referential
ﬂavour. An individual similarly has the ability to reﬂect
upon, comment about, and report a variety of mental
states. Metacognition—cognition about cognition—
thus forms an umbrella term under which to group
such mental phenomena. While cognitive science has
begun to outline the workings of phenomena such as
vision and memory (albeit with much work left to be
done), a computational and a neural understanding
of metacognition remain at an early stage.
Thearticlescollectedinthisissuebegintotacklethese
problems by drawing on multiple levels of analysis, from
single-neuron recordings to social psychology. We hope
that this cross section will lead to further integration
between disciplines, and provide a ‘big picture’ of how
different theoretical constructs and empirical ﬁndings
within the metacognition literature might relate to one
another. To the extent that an account of the neural
basis of metacognition informs an understanding of the
representational structure of mind in humans and
other animals (see §6), this research project can guide
(and be guided by) parallel developments in philosophy
of mind.
In this introductory article, we provide an overview
of the ﬁeld and direct the reader to articles within the
volume that may be of particular interest. While we
pursue a balanced summary of contributors’ views,
we also aim for synthesis.
Untilrelativelyrecently,theempiricalstudyofreports
about cognition was limited to the domain of memory,
where a theoretical framework and subtle empirical
tools were developed to study the relationship between
cognition about cognition, and cognition itself (the
‘meta’ and ‘object’ levels, respectively [1]). A subjec-
tively rich example is the ‘tip of the tongue’ (TOT)
state: if I ask you to recall Elton John’s real name, you
might have a strong feeling that you know the answer
without being able to recall it. In memory research,
metacognition was invoked to account for the ability
of subjects to strategically control their learning, which
Tulving & Madigan [2] termed one of the ‘truly
unique characteristics of human memory; its knowledge
of its own knowledge’. For example, a student who
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might be motivated to take a trip to the library to brush
up on the relevant material. Much progress has been
made in understanding the psychology of metamemory
and its putative role in the control of behaviour, develop-
ments comprehensively covered in recent authoritative
collections [3,4]. This issue does not speciﬁcally focus
uponmetamemory,althoughmanycontributionsinevita-
bly draw on this literature. Instead, metacognition is
characterized as operating in several domains, freeing it
from the constraints of particular paradigms. As we shall
see, this broader framework may have distinct advantages
for computational accounts of metacognitive processes
(which may be particularly tractable in areas such as
decision-making), and for establishing the presence or
absence of metacognition in non-human animals.
2. DEFINITION AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS
Metacognition is a broad term, and often interpreted
differently by different researchers. As a ﬁrst step,
it is crucial to separate the empirical deﬁnition of
metacognition from its epistemological status as a
meta-level representation of an object-level cognition.
Empirically, metacognition is often operationalized as
‘behaviour about behaviour’ rather than ‘cognition
about cognition’ ([5]; see table 1 in Fleming &
Dolan [6]). Here, we deﬁne second-order behaviours
as decisions contingent on other behavioural outputs
(that either have occurred or will occur). Consider a
visual detection task. Following a ﬁrst-order response
as to whether the stimulus is present or absent, a con-
ﬁdence judgement in one’s response being correct is
second-order with respect to the previous decision.
This does not necessarily entail that the second-order
judgement requires a meta-level representation of the
object-level decision; it could instead be accomplished
via object-level representations, for example, by basing
conﬁdence on information about the stimulus. Alter-
natively, the conﬁdence judgement could be based
on a meta-representation of the decision and sub-
sequent response. This creates an initial division of
the theoretical landscape, with two orthogonal
dimensions—those of level of representation and order
of behaviour (ﬁgure 1).
Often,researchersrestrictthedeﬁnitionofmetacogni-
tion to the kind of second-order behaviour available for
subjective report [6]. In many of these cases, it seems
intuitive that the report is capturing an aspect of cogni-
tion that is secondary to the cognitive process itself.




This is a case where ﬁrst-order (visuomotor) perform-
ance is high, but awareness is absent. Yet, the reliance
on subjective reports to index metacognition precludes
the ascription of metacognition to non-human animals
and non-verbal infants, and may prematurely equate
metacognition with consciousness (see §6). In contrast,
non-verbal behavioural measures do not suffer from
these drawbacks. Smith et al. [10] review a large body
of work in non-human animals using the ‘uncertain-
option’ paradigm. In these studies, some animals
adaptively use an ‘uncertain-option’ response to opt-
out of difﬁcult perceptual decisions. Such behaviour
alone is ﬁrst-order, and Smith et al. consider several
objections to a metacognitive characterization of the
uncertain-option task. The authors point out that
humans report feelings of uncertainty when making
similar responses, and argue we should not hold back
from a metacognitive explanation of behaviour in the
case of non-verbal responses by non-human animals.
Kepecs & Mainen [7] agree that we should not set
the bar higher for non-human animals than humans,
and point out that it is often taken for granted that
judgements of uncertainty in humans involve metacog-
nition. They suggest that things become clearer when a
non-verbal measure is elicited separately from the
object-level cognition, helping to rule out alternative
explanations of the data. Kepecs & Mainen [7]p r e s e n t
data from a novel measure that satisﬁes these con-
straints: how long is an animal willing to wait for a
reward after completing a decision? Importantly, such
a measurement strategy permits an analysis of metacog-
nitive accuracy—the relationship, on a trial-by-trial
basis, between ﬁrst-order performance and second-
order behaviour (waiting time)—that is contingent on
performance [6]. For example, if my willingness to
wait for a reward increases in tandem with the prob-
ability of being correct, then, in this case, I can be
ascribed a high degree of metacognitive accuracy.
Despite this focus on second-order behaviour, it
may be premature to conclude that such behaviours



























Figure 1. A three-dimensional map of the conceptual
landscape in metacognition research. There are potential
dissociationsbetweenlevelsofrepresentation,ordersofbehav-
iour and access consciousness. Stars indicate our best guess
of where some of the theories and measures outlined in this
overview are situated in this landscape. 1, ‘direct translation’
models of decision conﬁdence [7]; 2, representational–
redescription theory of consciousness [8]; 3, ﬁrst-order
responses to a suprathreshold stimulus. It remains an empiri-
cal question as to the degree of independence between the
dimensions sketched here.
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in which the strength of evidence supporting a
response option is used to guide both choice and
reports of conﬁdence (see §4). This is an example of
the ‘direct-translation’ class of models [11], where
the same information governs both ﬁrst- and second-
order behaviour. In contrast, Yeung & Summerﬁeld
[12] review a class of models in which post-decision
processing contributes to metacognitive report. Such
models can accommodate dissociations between the
object-level and the meta-level, such as when brain
damage selectively affects metacognitive accuracy,
but not task performance [8,9,13]. However, and
this is a crucial point, whether the second-order
behaviours often used to index metacognition can be
explicable in non-metarepresentational terms remains
an empirical question. We might ﬁnd that an object-
level account is sufﬁcient to explain second-order
behaviour in some circumstances, but not others. On
the other hand, evidence from human neuropsychology
that ﬁrst- and second-order behavioural performances
are dissociable suggests that at least some degree of
separate representation will be required to account for
second-order behaviours [6,9,14].
3. TYPES OF METACOGNITION
A related issue is that of the referent of metacognitive
judgements. Overgaard & Sandberg [15] compare
and contrast types of metacognitive report that have
been used in the literature on perceptual decision-
making. In a typical task, participants make a visual
judgement (such as indicating whether a stimulus is
present or absent) and then provide a second-order
report about this judgement. Overgaard and Sandberg
contrast judgements about the process of cognition
(conﬁdence in having been correct) with introspective
judgements about the visual content (such as stimulus
visibility). Relatedly, Timmermans et al. [8] suggest
that neural network architectures for metacognition
should represent ‘not only the content but also the
accuracy of ...knowledge’. While reports about con-
tent and process are often correlated (i.e. visibility
ratings tend to covary with conﬁdence ratings), with
careful analyses, report-speciﬁc features begin to
emerge [15]. While this debate is currently most devel-
oped in the visual decision literature, one can imagine
a similar content versus process distinction being made
in domains such as memory (compare feeling-of-know-
ing and judgements of learning). Further, Overgaard &
Sandberg [15] regard introspection as a special case:
‘...metacognition is functionally deﬁned...[whereas]
introspection can only be about a speciﬁcally con-
scious state’. We will return to the problem of relating
metacognition to consciousness in §6.
Bahrami et al. [16] also examine the role of report
type but with a focus on social context. Pairs of sub-
jects carried out visual contrast discriminations, and,
in cases of disagreement, were allowed to confer to
come to a joint decision. A previous study found that
when the subject pairs had similar perceptual sensi-
tivities, joint performance was better than either
individual alone. In contrast, when their sensitivities
markedly differed, collaboration was detrimental [17].
In the current issue, follow-up experiments are repor-
ted in which report type—verbal or non-verbal—was
systematically manipulated [16]. Intriguingly, the
harmful effects of collaboration for mismatched indivi-
duals are alleviated when a non-verbal report schema
is used (a visual analogue scale for conﬁdence). In
contrast, when group members had similar sensitivities
then best performance was achieved through direct
verbal communication. These results suggest that dif-
ferent aspects of metacognition play different roles in
social communication.
Metacognitive judgements may differ in the level to
which they refer. Metcalfe et al. [18]( s e ea l s o[ 19])
make a distinction between three levels of metacognitive
judgements: anoetic, concerning objects in the world;
noetic,concerningmentalrepresentations;andautonoetic,
in which the referent includes the self. We note that the
distinction between anoetic and noetic may relate to
the distinction between judgements of content and pro-
cess raised above. Metcalfe et al. [18]o p e r a t i o n a l i z e
noetic metacognition as judgements of performance,
and autonoetic metacognition as judgements of agency.
Theydemonstratethat,comparedwithcontrols, patients
with schizophrenia manifest aberrant judgements of
agency, but intact judgements of performance in a
dynamic motor task. In §5 below, we consider how cog-
nitive neuroscience may shed light on domain-general
versus domain-speciﬁc accounts of metacognition.
4. COMPUTATION: CONFIDENCE AS A
TEST CASE
Second-order judgements are often concerned with
the relative certainty or uncertainty of a ﬁrst-order
mental state. Consider a feeling-of-knowing judge-
ment as tapping the certainty of a memory, or a
visibility judgement as tapping the certainty of percep-
tion. More recently, neuroscientists have focused on
conﬁdence, or its complement, uncertainty, as a quan-
tity that is tractable both for computational modelling
and neural analysis [20,21]. Further, a computational
deﬁnition of conﬁdence can formalize intuition, and
potentially unify several semantic concepts within a
common framework [7].
Both Kepecs & Mainen [7] and Yeung & Summerﬁeld
[12]reviewrecentcomputationalmodelsofdecisioncon-
ﬁdence. Kepecs & Mainen [7] propose a signal detection
theoretic model of conﬁdence, such that conﬁdence is
equated with the evidence supporting one choice over
another. Such a model can be extended to the dynamic
case, by postulating accumulation of evidence over time
[22],andinstantiatedinneuralnetworks[23].Incontrast,
Yeung & Summerﬁeld [12]h i g h l i g h tac e n t r a lr o l ef o r
post-decisional processing in the construction of meta-
cognitive estimates of conﬁdence. They draw together
hitherto disparate literatures on error-monitoring and
decision conﬁdence, and propose that these represent
special cases of a more general class of second-order
decisions. In particular, they point out that ﬂuctuations
in graded judgements of conﬁdence are often studied by
changing the quality of evidence (such as visual contrast),
whereas error-monitoring research focuses on changing
the quantity of evidence (such as when participants are
placed under time pressure). Both variables can be
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its post-decisional extensions that account for changes of
mind and error correction. Despite this elegant synthesis,
the authors argue that in the real world, sensorimotor
interaction unfolds continuously, and the concept of a
‘post-decision’ metacognitive judgement may be less
a p p l i c a b l e .I n s t e a d ,t h e yp r o p o s et h a tt h eprecision of a
neural representation (the reciprocal of its variance) at
any given moment in time is used to inform judgements
of conﬁdence about the represented mental property.
Intriguingly,othercontributionstotheissuealsomake
use of the concept of conﬁdence-as-precision. Bahrami
et al.[ 16] model conﬁdence as the ratio of the mean of
the sensory estimate to its standard deviation or, equiva-
lently, to the product of the mean and its precision. Ko &
Lau [9] propose that criteria for report in a visual
detection task are set based on knowledge of one’s
signal-to-noise statistics (see also Lau [24]). These
ideas are potentially consistent with recent neural
coding models, which propose that patterns of ﬁring
in cortex encode parameters of the probability distri-
bution that is the result of probabilistic inference, i.e.
both its mean and covariance [25]. Empirical work
is now required to compare and contrast different
computationalhypothesesregardingdecisionconﬁdence.
A second problem for computational models of
metacognition is how conﬁdence information is ‘read
out’ for use in second-order behaviours. Timmermans
et al.[ 8] demonstrate that this type of computation
can be achieved via a two-layer neural network architec-
ture, in which the second-order network receives
information about the performance of the ﬁrst-order
network and uses this information to generate reports
of conﬁdence. Such a model has the attractive property
of accounting for dissociations between ﬁrst-order
and second-order decision performance. One interest-
ing possibility is that higher-order brain areas in
prefrontal cortex (PFC) explicitly represent the pre-
cision of object-level representations, thereby linking
Yeung & Summerﬁeld’s account of conﬁdence with
Timmermans et al.’s two-layer architecture. Kepecs &
Mainen [7] note that this read-out process must itself
be calibrated, perhaps, requiring slow learning over
time; Timmermans et al. [8] shed light on this issue by
analysingtheir neuralnetwork’smetacognitiveperform-
ance during the training phase, demonstrating gradual
changes in metacognitive sensitivity and calibration (as
assessed via type 2 signal detection analysis).
There is a rich literature on the computation and
usage of uncertainty to optimize decision-making
[25,26],butonethatoftenremainsseparatefromthelit-
erature on metacognition. We suggest that a proﬁtable
avenue for future research is the degree to which such
models of behaviour account for metacognitive reports,
situating metacognition more precisely in relation to
other aspects of behaviour (see Maniscalco & Lau
[27], for a related approach).
5. NEUROBIOLOGICAL SUBSTRATES OF
METACOGNITION
Early accounts of the neural substrates of metacogni-
tion focused on patients with lesions to the PFC and
impaired metamemory (see Shimamura [28], for a
review). These dissociations were interpreted in the
context of the PFC implementing the meta-level of
Nelson & Narens [1], or perhaps the second-order
network in more recent computational accounts
[8,23]. Fleming & Dolan [6] review recent studies
that harness a variety of methods in cognitive neuro-
science to draw relationships between brain structure
and function and metacognitive capacity. They note
that a crucial aspect of this research programme is
the independent measurement of both task perform-
ance and second-order report, as inter-dependencies
between these levels otherwise render it difﬁcult to
dissociate a neural correlate of one from the other
(see also [29]). Studies employing such methods
reveal distinct neural substrates for prospective and
retrospective second-order judgements, and suggest
the existence of rich second-order corrective behaviours
accountedforbypost-decisionalprocessing[6,12].Note
thathere,again,evidenceforadissociablerepresentation
governing second-order behaviour does not necessarily
entail it being a metarepresetation, and further work is
needed to understand the interactions between putative
prefrontal representations controlling second-order
behaviour and object-level representations underlying
ﬁrst-order behaviour.
The development of measures of second-order be-
haviour in non-human animals [10] has led to the
possibility of direct recordings from single neurons
during second-order judgements. Previous studies
have relied on an object-level framework, where conﬁ-
dence is equated with the information that governs the
choiceprocess[30–32].Asnotedabove,thisframework
potentiallyconfoundsneuralactivityrepresentingconﬁ-
dence from that representing the graded value of one
decision option over the other. However, the develop-
ment of paradigms in which conﬁdence and choice
are measured independently on each trial suggests
that neural recordings relating task performance to
conﬁdence in non-human animals are likely to be docu-
mented in the near future [7,33].
A related perspective on the neural basis of metacog-
nition is provided by examining neuropsychiatric cases
in which metacognition is systematically impaired. As
noted in §3, these studies often tap into a self-related
component of metacognition: ‘insight’ into a character-
isticofone’sbehaviourorillness.Davidetal.[14]review
a series of studies examining metacognitive function in
patientswithAlzheimer’sdisease,braininjuryorschizo-
phrenia, and relate these measures to assessment of
clinical insight. Together, their work suggests fraction-
ation between different types of insight, such that
insight into oneaspect of pathology does notnecessarily
predict insight into another. Furthermore, they show
that the activity of anterior medial PFC is increased
during self-reﬂection in controls, but not in
schizophrenic patients. They suggest that medial PFC
dysfunction may mediate metacognitive deﬁcits in
psychopathology.
6. RELATIONSHIP TO CONSCIOUS AWARENESS
Deﬁning consciousness is notoriously tricky, even
more so than deﬁning metacognition. Block draws a
distinction between phenomenal consciousness—the
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ciousness, which includes availability to cognitive
processing, the capacity to report, act and so forth
[34]. It is not immediately clear how second-order
behaviours ﬁt into this framework. In particular,
access consciousness is present in a large number of
ﬁrst-order cases, such as when one responds to or
classiﬁes a stimulus. Conversely, Fleming and Dolan
[6] note that error-related (second-order) adjustments
in behaviour can occur in the absence of subjective
reports (e.g. [35]; see also [12]). Thus, access conscious-
ness may represent a third orthogonal dimension of our
theoretical landscape (ﬁgure 1). Nevertheless, several
authors have suggested intimate links between meta-
cognition and conscious awareness [5,36,37], and a
widespread use of second-order behavioural measures
as empirical indices of awareness makes it important to
critically appraise this link.
On the empirical side, Overgaard & Sandberg [15]
draw a distinction between introspection and meta-
cognition, the former being a special case, where
participants are asked to comment directly on con-
scious experience. Furthermore, they argue that both
introspection and metacognition are dissociable from
report, motivating the use of measures such as type 2
signal detection theory that discount response bias to
assess introspective access. An interesting case study is
that of blindsight. Here, as noted above, metacognitive
measures dissociate from above-chance performance,
and do so in away that is difﬁcult to account for in a tra-
ditional signal detection framework. Ko & Lau [9]
propose that the lack of cognitive access in blindsight
can be explained by a failure of criterion setting based
on inaccurate meta-level knowledge of internal prob-
ability distributions following the lesion. Such a failure
to update subjective criteria is supported by a compu-
tational model in which a rapid decrease in visual
sensitivity is accompanied by suboptimal criterion set-
ting. This perspective suggests that metacognition may
enable reliable cognitive access (through accurate cri-
terion setting over time), but does not necessarily
predict whether a given trial will be reported as ‘aware’
or ‘unaware’.
On the theoretical side, Timmermans et al. [8]
propose that consciousness is a representational–
redescription process, with a hierarchy of predictive
loops gradually learning to re-represent ﬁrst-order
mental states. As such, consciousness is intimately
bound to meta-representation, and they suggest that
meta-representational capacity can be assessed by the
relationship between metacognitive reports and behav-
iour. As noted above, a deﬂationary explanation of
some types of metacognitive report that does not
appeal to meta-representation may be possible, and
it will important to consider this possibility on a
case-by-case basis [38].
Rosenthal has previously proposed an inﬂuential
higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness
in which mental states are conscious in virtue of a
metarepresentational state—an HOT—about them
[39]. Rosenthal, like Timmermans et al.[ 8], notes
that being aware of a mental state appears to share
common ground with accounts of metacognition.
Indeed, the link between introspective reports and
PFC function has recently been deployed in support
of HOT theory [40]. However, Rosenthal [41]
argues that although consciousness and metacognition
involve higher-order capacity, they have little more in
common. In particular, Rosenthal points out that
metacognitive states, such as the tip-of-the-tongue
state discussed above, do not make one aware of the
mental state (the memory) it refers to, and thus are
distinct from HOTs. Introspection of content [15]
may be a better candidate for a link between HOT
and metacognition, and Rosenthal agrees that while
these reports may index HOTs, they also induce
a rare third-order state, in which one is aware of
one’s HOT.
As this brief summary indicates, the link between
metacognition and consciousness inevitably depends
on one’s favoured deﬁnition of each. As depicted in
ﬁgure 1, access consciousness may dissociate from
both second-order behaviour and meta-level represen-
tation, opening up new questions for empirical
research aimed at populating this conceptual land-
scape. For example, it will be important to assess
whether having meta-level content is necessary and
sufﬁcient for a state to be conscious, and the type of
behavioural measure that will allow us to reliably
identify such a meta-level state. Progress in resolving
this question will undoubtedly beneﬁt from an inter-
action between theorists developing accounts of
consciousness and empirical researchers reﬁning the
measurement of metacognitive behaviour.
7. THE FUNCTION OF METACOGNITION
The function of metacognition has usually been con-
strued in terms of control of behaviour and mental
processes: the implication is that accurate control
requires accurate monitoring [1]. However, recent
attempts to distil metacognition from other potentially
confounding variables have led to a seeming paradox:
if, to measure metacognition, one needs ﬁrst to dis-
count the inﬂuence of ﬁrst-order behaviour [27,42],
then the functional beneﬁts of metacognitive capacity
would appear moot. Perhaps, instead, metacognitive
capacity is not necessary for controlling simple beha-
viours, but becomes relevant for complex abilities
such as reasoning and planning. Fletcher & Carruthers
[43] critically appraise this hypothesis, presenting a
deﬂationary account of a metacognitive system for
human reasoning. They argue that reasoning can often
be explained by an appeal to individual strategies
acquired through individual and cultural learning.
However,theyalso suggestthata dedicated‘mind-read-
ing system’ is recruited in a self-monitoring capacity to
guide reasoning, an example of a system originally
evolved to serve social functions playing a special role
in self-directed cognition (see Carruthers [44]).
Frith has proposed that metacognitive states are
useful precisely because they can be communicated
to others, promoting social interaction [45]. Bahrami
et al.[ 16] further suggest that communicating meta-
cognitive conﬁdence may act to replace explicit
feedback about decision outcomes, and thus provide
an ecologically relevant role for metacognition in
social learning. This hypothesis is supported by
1284 S. M. Fleming et al. Introduction. Metacognition: an overview
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2012)empirical work demonstrating that explicit feedback is
not required to reap the beneﬁts of cooperation for
decision-making. The ability to reap cooperative
beneﬁt requires reﬂection on performance, communi-
cation of conﬁdence to others and comparison of one’s
conﬁdence with that of the group, and metacognition
presumably plays a central role in this process [46].
A natural place to look for a function of metacogni-
tion is in cases where it goes awry. David et al. [14]
draw a link between metacognitive failure and lack of
insight in psychosis, but note that the picture is far
from clear: while insight is separable from primary
symptomology, there is a complex relationship
between measures of cognitive and clinical insight.
Metcalfe et al. [18] point out that the neural substrates
of autonoetic, or self-related, metacognition [47,48]
are strikingly similar to those isolated in studies of
metacognition of decision-making [6]. As lack of
insight into illness is dysfunctional in terms of progno-
sis [49] and failure to self-medicate [50], one function
of metacognition may be to promote on-going moni-
toring and control to the level of explicit awareness
(cf. Block’s ‘monitoring’ consciousness, [34]), thus
allowing self-referential decisions to be made.
Finally, an intriguing idea is that metacognition is
functional precisely because it enables representation
of the absence of knowledge. Object-level represen-
tations are often concerned with presence of stimuli
in the world; they rarely deal in absence (consider
the failure to represent the blindspot in vision). In
contrast, ‘knowing I do not know’ is a meta-level
representation of the absence of object-level memory.
Investigating this putative function may beneﬁt from
greater integration with work quantifying epistemic be-
haviour—by sampling information over time, an agent
can adaptively reduce its uncertainty, achieving a
balance between the additional cost of exploration
and the beneﬁt of gaining further information [51].
Interestingly, one key variable in driving further
information-gathering is the current (im)precision
of one’s representation, providing a connection to
computational models of conﬁdence discussed in §4.
These suggestions for functional roles are not
mutually exclusive. A natural direction for future
research is situating our evolving mechanistic under-
standing of metacognition in a functional context in
order to critically evaluate such hypotheses.
8. CONCLUSION
In this article, we provide an overview of the content of
this Theme Issue, and draw links between different
domains of enquiry. Speciﬁcally, we propose a frame-
work in which level of representation, order of
behaviour and access consciousness are orthogonal
dimensions of the conceptual landscape (ﬁgure 1).
We believe there is much to be gained by grounding
future studies of metacognition in this framework.
Any overview is necessarily brief, and we encourage
the reader to delve deeper into this Theme Issue, and
to read the articles cited here. We are excited by the
rapid development in this relatively young ﬁeld; there
is rich potential for cross-disciplinary collaborations
that span several levels of analysis, from single-neuron
recordings to philosophy of mind. Science is a
quintessentially metacognitive activity: it continually
questions itself, probing and testing the robustness of
accumulated knowledge. Articles in this Theme Issue
highlight the existence of some knowledge we do
have, and much that we do not. By embracing just as
many questions as answers, we are conﬁdent that this
issue will lead to further progress in understanding
the metacognitive components of mind.
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